Describe a project in which you were participated. What activities were involved and how were they interrelated? How would you rate the project manager? What is
the basis of your evaluation?

Visit the Hunt Library and conduct an article research regarding an aspect or item associated with SMS. Summarize the article, explain and correlate the relevancy of the article to the module and, of course, have the proper citation
Module objective

this module, you should be able to:

1. Define Safety Management System the features of the “Four pillars”.
2. Explain the development of SMS both nationally and internationally.
3. Explain the role of audits and inspections within the SMS program.
4. Identify the various risk assessment and calculation formats used in SMS.
5. Discuss the various communication portals needed for a safety program.
6. Explain the purpose of the risk/hazard matrix and severity classifications.
7. Discuss the significance of proactive risk reduction.
8. Defend the economic costs of a proactive safety program.

ACTIVE Participation – Module 2 “Real-World” Discussion forum:

NOTE: This discussion forum counts towards your grade. It will NOT be accessible after the due date for your Module 2 assignments.

Find an annual report for a comany of interest. You are welcome to choose the same company as you used in our forum for previous module. Publicly held company annual reports (10K) can be located via a search link at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm

NOTE: To perform the search in the Edgar Archives the best way is to enter the “ticker symbol” for the company. In Yahoo finance (MSN, or other investment websites) enter the company’s name next to the icon “Get Quotes”. For example, Tech Data Corp’s ticker symbol is “TECD” and Bloomin’ Brands ticker symbol is “BLMN”. If you need assistance, please e-mail me.

Click on the link to “Interactive Data” and then the link to the “Financial Statements”. Select 3 ratios that were discussed in Chapter 15. (NOTE: A complete listing of the ratios is on pages 745-6 which includes the formulas and purpose of each ratio. Calculate these ratios for each of the years provided in the comparative financial statements (usually 2-3 years of information is provided). Share your calculations and any insights/thoughts from your analysis of these ratios including trends (i.e., is the company performing better or worse relative to the previous year).

Write 1-2 pages single spaced that addresses the following topic….Risk = The probability of Threat x vulnerability to that threat x consequences or loss of value of the asset. However, Risk is rarely isolated. Comment on the approach in (Griener. 2000) and top down versus bottom up risk analysis….
Here is the lecture:
Commentary
What’s a Disaster? What’s a Crisis?
Terminology is not completely standardized, so this will complicate your reading for this course. Lindell, Prater, and Perry define the terms hazard, emergency, and disaster at the beginning of Chapter 1. FEMA uses similar definitions (e.g., in the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide [CPG] 101), but the definitions are a bit different in ASIS International’s 2009 national standard and other publications. In the field of information technology, incidents are actions that violate or threaten to violate security policies, while disasters overwhelm an organization’s ability to handle the event and typically require moving essential functions to an alternate location.
A crisis generally poses a strategic threat that requires attention from and involvement of the highest levels of an organization. The impact can be to the organization’s people, mission, its financial stability, or its reputation and credibility. Like disasters, crises typically imply single, sudden, large events, but they have secondary meanings that denote a state of affairs — something that has duration. The onset may also be preceded by smaller events or incidents, by the growth of a condition, or the compounding of inter-related failures. Using an analogy from medicine, think of small strokes preceding a large stroke or the buildup of plaque in arteries leading to a heart attack. These would be termed “slow-onset” crises.
Risks to Assets
The assets of an organization include people, intellectual property (both information/data and processes), facilities, equipment, and other physical components. ASIS identifies these assets at risk: “Human Resources and Intellectual Assets; Information/Data; Facilities and Premises; Ethics and Reputation; Transportation, Distribution, and Supply Chain; Environmental, Health, and Safety; Financial Assets; … Vendor/Outsourcing” (2008, p. 5). ASIS also identifies legal and regulatory risks to organizations.
For a community, assets encompass households, businesses (for-profit and not-for-profit), government agencies, infrastructure, and even special features, such as a waterfront. The assets need to be assigned a value, even if it is a ranking such as High, Moderate, and Low.
The diagram in the attached file presents the concepts that make up risk to assets. Here, too, the terminology can vary. For example:
• Threat, hazard
• Vulnerability, exposure, weakness
• Countermeasure, safeguard, control
• Consequence, impact, harm
One term missing from the diagram is the likelihood of the threat exploiting the vulnerability. And likelihood may be characterized in terms of probability or frequency. The following sections explore threats, vulnerabilities, controls, consequences, and likelihood.
For other terms, see the Department of Homeland Security’s DHS risk lexicon (2010), which defines nearly 125 terms associated with risk management and analysis from a homeland security perspective, from “absolute risk” to “vulnerability assessment.”
Threats
Threats are a potential cause of harm to assets; they can be events, physical objects, or humans. Lindell et al. present various types of natural threats; their list could be expanded to include disease (such as pandemic flu) and infestations (such as insects, rodents, etc.). They also list technological threats, emphasizing hazardous materials. Other kinds of technological threats include structural and infrastructure failures; examples include bridges or dams, machinery, utilities, and hardware and software. The more complex a system, the more potential there is for problems, and Chiles’ book Inviting disaster: Lessons from the edge of technology (2002) provides numerous examples. Many technological threats are exacerbated by human factors such as management and operational problems; the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 is a significant example. Perrow provides a more nuanced analysis, covering not only the human factors (as in the 2009 Metrorail disaster), but also distinguishing between “integrated” and “modular” designs of complex systems (2009).
Human threats are another major category. The actions of human threat agents may be intentional or deliberate; accidental; or negligent. Intentional acts may be criminal (sabotage, espionage, terrorism, product tampering or counterfeiting, fraud) or not (e.g., boycotting the products or blockading the location of a business; hostile takeovers by another company). Accidental threats may come from errors or omissions. In a business context, accidental threats can occur because of poor procedures (they are incorrect, hard to understand, or non-existent), poor communication or bad information, poor training, or other reasons. Negligence implies that a certain standard of care or due diligence is expected. Negligence is, for example, a failure to comply with existing regulations, policies, standards, or procedures. Acts of management or of employees may be negligent, such as overriding a policy, mismanaging resources, or deception. Note that sometimes it is difficult to determine if an action is accidental or negligent. Indeed, it may not be clear at the start of some events — for example, fires — whether humans or other factors cause them.
The study of human threats also looks at whether the agent is internal to an organization (such as employees or citizens) or external. In business, the distinction between internal and external is not always exact, as there can be a continuum from inside to outside. All sorts of people may be allowed access to an organization, such as customers, contractors and vendors, third-party partners, or visitors. Ex-employees may also have access.
Insider threats may be harder to detect and insiders may cause more significant damage. Think, for example, of FBI agent Robert Hanssen who was selling information to the Russians over the course of two decades. Insider threats and incidents for the banking and financial industry were the subject of a 2004 study conducted by the U.S. Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center and CERT/CC. The insiders typically had “minimal technical skills” but had authorization to use the systems. However, they misused or exceeded their authorization. The National Infrastructure Advisory Council’s 2008 report describes behavioral characteristics of insiders who may pose a threat, explains why organizations fail to deal with such persons, and makes recommendations.
Speed of onset is one characteristic of a threat or hazard. Other characteristics are the scope and the duration of the impact; how predictable the event is; what the primary impacts to assets are, and whether there are secondary impacts; and the state of preparation to respond and recover. Lindell et al. present a similar list in Chapter 6, while CPG 101 lists other factors (see pp. 4-8 through 4-9). These lists were designed for physical threats, but could be adapted for cyber threats or organizational crises such as fraud, sexual harassment, or other forms of malfeasance.
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities allow potential threats to cause actual events. In risk management terms, threats exploit vulnerabilities, which are weaknesses or susceptibilities to damage or disruption. Vulnerabilities may be understood as controls that are absent, weak, or flawed. (Controls are discussed in the next section.) For example,
• No fence = absent control
• Short fence = weak control
• Hole in fence or fence poorly constructed = flawed control
Some kinds of vulnerabilities are considered conditions, such as high population density for a community, the location of an organization, or the type of industry a business is in (e.g., airlines, shipping, etc.). Sometimes the distinction between threat and vulnerability becomes fuzzy around the concept of condition or circumstances. My preference is to treat circumstances and conditions as vulnerabilities that a threat agent can exploit.
Lindell et al. provide an in-depth discussion of vulnerabilities in Chapter 6, including what they call “vulnerability dynamics.” Vulnerabilities are categorized in different ways. Social vulnerabilities revolve around how well individuals, households, or other social units can deal with disasters. Physical vulnerabilities arise from design, the materials used, implementation or construction, as well as factors such as neglected or improper maintenance, all of which are influenced by costs. The same concerns apply to software in computers and other electronic devices. Geographic vulnerabilities play a role in natural disasters such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes or, for business operations, political conditions or currency markets.
Complexity and interdependencies can obscure vulnerabilities and they can complicate efforts to respond effectively when an incident occurs, such as during the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor incident in 1979. Malfunctioning valves led to overheating of reactor coolant, causing a relief valve to open; the relief valve then did not close when it should have, and coolant drained out of the reactor. Operators, however, mistakenly believed that there was too much coolant, and drained out more coolant, leading to a meltdown of half of the reactor core (Chiles, 2002, p. 47). Perrow (2009) cites examples of airplane computers involved in accidents and near-accidents.
Controls to Mitigate (Reduce) Risk and Other Strategies
As mentioned above, one definition of vulnerability is a control that is absent, flawed or weak. The term control includes safeguards (proactive controls) and countermeasures (reactive controls). Controls mitigate risks by reducing a threat’s impacts or its likelihood, or both. Only rarely do they completely eliminate threats; that is a message that must be stated clearly (and often) to management.
One way to classify controls is whether they help to prevent (or protect or deter), detect, or respond to and recover from adverse events. Lindell et al. use the term hazard mitigation to refer to prevention controls. The levee system in New Orleans is a protection control, as are, for example, regulations about insider trading. Detection may take the form of monitoring. Examples include sensors for natural phenomena (earthquakes) or technology (pressure, temperature, traces of harmful materials, etc.). On the enterprise side, examples of monitoring might be collecting and analyzing reports of product failures or customer complaints, tracking of adherence to policies, etc. Other forms of detection include testing and quality control as well as auditing. The third area is controls for response or recovery. Here are some examples: Stockpiles of vaccines or medicines; enough trained emergency personnel; sufficient insurance or reserve funds to carry out recovery. The list is long and varied.
Consequences (Impacts)
Consequences of an adverse event are also referred to as its impacts. Some consequences are primary while others are secondary. For example, storms or flooding may have secondary consequences such as disruption of utilities or transportation.
Human impacts vary, depending on the type of crisis or disaster. Most people think first of death, injury, and illness when they discuss human impacts, but there may also be psychological and social impacts. Physical damage and destruction, whether with or without environmental consequences are created by many kinds of disasters. The consequences can disrupt vital critical infrastructures such as energy, water, communications, or transportation.
A disruption can impact an organization’s processes, the outputs of the processes, or the resources used to create the outputs, such as people, financial condition, facilities, equipment, materials and supplies. A disaster or crisis may slow or even disrupt cash flow to an organization (accounts receivable) or tourists may stay away, impacting the local economy. Responding to a crisis can also drain an organization’s or local government’s resources. There may be unplanned expenses to restore and rebuild, for example. A disaster or crisis may also result in increased insurance rates for an organization, or even being unable to obtain insurance. Primary threats to organizations’ financial assets include fraud, theft, or extortion, or negligence such as making extremely risky investments.
Other non-physical consequences may be political or legal. A crisis may draw the attention of politicians, as happened to Veterans Affairs in summer 2006 because a stolen laptop contained personally identifiable information of 26 million veterans. Regulations may be changed or added to respond to a crisis. There can be legal reactions to crises, such as government investigation and prosecution; for example, Hewlett-Packard was investigated by the California attorney general for spying on members of its board of directors and reporters to uncover leaks. Another legal reaction is filing of lawsuits. Defending against lawsuits incurs legal costs and loss of a lawsuit may require a substantial payout to the plaintiffs, such as in tobacco liability cases.
With or without political or legal consequences, an organization (or even an industry segment) can suffer harm to its reputation. Loss of reputation sometimes occurs because the organization is perceived as unprepared, but more often the image issues arise because the organization’s poor response or mishandling of the response. When reputation is damaged, there is a loss of confidence in the organization, both externally (customers, suppliers, shareholders, the general public, or — in the case of charities — donors) and internally (employees). For example, customers abandoned ValuJet after the 1996 fatal crash caused by negligence. The Department of Veterans Affairs is closely scrutinized by congressional committees since the 2006 data loss and is the subject of a specific law (P.L. 109-461).
Likelihood, Probability, and Frequency
Likelihood is the extent to which an event is apt to occur. Probability is the statistical expression of likelihood. It may be expressed on a scale from 0 (not likely) to 1 (certain) or in terms of percentages (a 75% chance).
Events that are low in probability or have not been experienced are difficult to conceptualize, even though the impact may be disastrous. For example, the Iowa floods of 2008 may have had a probability of just 0.2% (two-tenths of one percent). Therefore, it is common to recast probability in terms of frequency — a 500-year flood, in other words. “The frequency format implies that one is being asked about things that have happened — which may justify an inference that they will happen about as often in the future — rather than about things that haven’t happened yet though they may in the future” (Posner, 2004, p. 10). Still, low probability or frequency can lead an organization to under-invest in prevention and preparation. Thus, a trick is to change the reference timeframe. For example, 1% or once in 100 years can be rephrased as 20% likelihood in the next 20 years. Low-probability events with high impacts should be the focus of crisis management planning (Sheffi, 2005, p. 251).
You need historical data to calculate probability and frequency. Studies of accidents in large organizations or across an industry can provide rich data not only on the number of accidents but also the “near misses.” A pioneer in this field was H.W. Heinrich, who began publishing in the 1930s. Heinrich’s model is known as “Heinrich’s Triangle.” While I have seen slight variations in the numbers used, here’s an approximation of the complete Heinrich’s Triangle:
1 major accident
30 (or 29) serious accidents
300 recordable incidents with no injury
3000 near misses
30,000 unsafe actions
The triangle disregards the causes of the accidents, beyond the general point made by Heinrich that behavior contributes to the accidents (1959).
However, historical data is not always available, particularly for certain types of events. Sheffi notes that it is difficult to calculate the statistical probability of deliberate human threats: “Intentional disruptions constitute adaptable threats in which the perpetrators seek both to ensure the success of the attack and to maximize the damage” (2005, p. 50). To model intentional threats, one must factor in the capabilities, intents, and underlying motives of the perpetrators (Ezell, Bennett, von Winterfeldt, Sokolowski, & Collins, 2010, p. 577).
Likelihood needs to be periodically re-examined, because factors can either deteriorate or ameliorate. For example, building more homes along beachfronts or switching to Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) lead to increased risks, while implementing additional controls will decrease risks (Jrad, Morawski & Spergel, 2004). In addition, new threats may arise, such as “spear phishing” attacks.
Risk Assessment / Risk Analysis
Risk assessment or risk analysis encompasses identifying and evaluating risks and their degree of impact. The terms “assessment” and “analysis” are often used interchangeably. ASIS (2009, p. 49) implies that “assessment” is a broad process that starts with identifying risks, then analyzes them, and results in an evaluation, while “analysis” is more detailed, with the objective of determining the degree of risk.
Risk analysis is a core competency according to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), comprising “knowledge and skills” to conduct quality risk analyses; that is, a risk analysis needs to be “accurate, documented, objective, defensible, transparent, and complete” (DHS, 2009, p. 84). Appendix 3A of NIPP expands on these criteria and offers guidance on assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts (p. 148).
Risk Assessment Techniques
Risk assessment is based on inputs such as these:
Assets
• Identify
• Determine value
• Prioritize
Threats
• Identify
• Estimate likelihood
Vulnerabilities
• Identify Impacts
• Estimate consequences (life and health; economic; mission; reputation; etc.)
Some techniques also require building scenarios for each threat or adverse event. The methods for scenario development vary from one discipline to another, but generally involve asking “What if…?”
NFPA 1600 presents several techniques for assessing risks, including these three (2010, p. 17):
• FMEA (failure modes and effects analysis) begins with a vulnerability and what conditions could make it actual; by implication, this uncovers what controls are missing. Through inductive reasoning, the analysts explore the possible impacts or effects.
• FTA (fault tree analysis) is a deductive technique that starts from the problem and seeks out the causes. It is a search for vulnerabilities that might be mitigated through controls.
• HAZOP, or hazard and operability studies, has its origins in process control industries such as chemicals. Its purpose is to review processes or systems, to determine if sufficient and adequate controls are in place to prevent failures or accidents.
Quantitative versus Qualitative Analysis
Analysis methods may be qualitative or quantitative. The methodology used in your organization may dictate how mathematical an analysis is required. A Chief Financial Officer is apt to want an analysis supported by numbers. A qualitative analysis, by contrast, may use categories such as High, Medium, and Low. Some models use a 5-factor scale, adding Very High and Very Low.
Bottom line: If your organization requires a certain methodology or model, use that. If it doesn’t employ a standard methodology or model, then the following examples may help you in recommending one.
Quantitative Analysis
Different organizations use different formulas to compute risk quantitatively. A common formula is
Risk = Threat * Vulnerability * Consequences (or Asset Value)
This formula only implies likelihood; it could be used to provide a worst-case scenario, where it is assumed that the threat will exploit the vulnerability, completely destroying the asset. Grenier (2000) presented a more nuanced version of this formula for critical infrastructure protection:
R = f { ( P (T x V) ) I x s x t x g}
Grenier’s definition of risk (the R in the formula) is: “The probability that a particular threat will exploit a particular infrastructure’s vulnerability (ies) weighted by the impact (s) of that exploitation. The Risk function can be further modified to account for seasonal, temporal and geographic variabilities. The time variables could allow for: time from incident until impacts are felt, duration of impacts, etc.” (Slide #3).
Frequency is an alternative to using probabilities. Frequency for risk analysis is typically expressed in terms of an annual basis; the formal term is annualized rate of occurrence, or ARO. Some quantitative analyses create a scale of frequency; for example, once every 300 years, every 30 years, every 3 years, annually, quarterly, monthly, weekly, daily, hourly, and more than hourly. For intentional threats, the frequency may represent only an estimate, which can shift based on countermeasures employed; for example, unarmed guards versus armed guards versus armed guards who draw their weapons when approached.
For consequences, formal quantitative risk analysis often uses the term single loss exposure (or SLE) instead of consequence or impact. The SLE is calculated by multiplying the value of the asset by the exposure factor, which is a percentage of asset value that is at risk (that is, how bad the loss could be, based on potential threats and vulnerabilities). Asset value, in a restricted sense, is the replacement value, not the depreciated value. A broader view of asset value is the total cost of the incident, including replacement or recovery of the asset as well as losses of sales or of customers; productivity of employees; penalties and legal costs; loss of intellectual property or secrets; and decline in goodwill or reputation of the organization.
Then, Annualized Loss Exposure is calculated by multiplying a single loss exposure by the annualized rate of occurrence, or: ALE = SLE x ARO.
Schneier presents a few examples (2004, pp. 301-302). One is for corporate network intrusions that infect end devices, with 3 events per day translating to about 1,000 events on an annual basis. The impact is the cost of cleaning up the infected systems.
Network intrusions per year 1,000
Cost to clean up $10,000
ALE $10,000,000
Schneier’s second example is of an intrusion by a competitor intending to steal a major corporate secret such as new design plans. Here, he switches to probability:
Probability of intrusion 0.001
Impact of information theft $10,000,000
ALE $10,000

The bottom line: Can you justify the cost of the controls? By reducing the exposure factor, is the new ALE acceptable?
Qualitative Analysis
Qualitative models typically compare a threat’s likelihood to impact, assigning High, Medium, or Low values to both likelihood and to the impact. These models often associate statistical values to the likelihood, with low in the range of 10% and high at 100% — a certainty, in other words. The following is adapted from Nyanchama (2005, p. 40). He also has a similar chart depicting the impact against the ease of exploiting vulnerabilities (Nyanchama, 2005, p. 52).

Impact
Threat Level High Medium Low
High H H M
Medium H M L
Low M L L

Wrobel’s qualitative approach uses a large number of parameters, including 3 different kinds of impact, to classify risks to information systems. The following chart is an adaptation from Wrobel (1997).

Evaluation Factors High Medium Low Low – No
Impact: Systems >75% 50-75% 25-50% <25%
Impact: Functional Entire mission ~50% mission ~25% mission Not mission critical
Impact: Users No access; >200 users Sporadic access; >50 users Noticeable; > 15 users Brief; < 15 users
Probability >75% 50-75% 25-50% <25%
Cost >$100K $50-100K $25-50K $0-25K
Controls None Difficult to implement At hand Automatic; redundant
Time to recover >2 hours 1-2 hours 10-60 min <10 min
Staff to respond Not available Available soon On site On site

Risk Is Not Isolated
A single threat or vulnerability may produce impacts that overwhelm all the controls in place to contain it. This is a common mode failure, and there are mathematical models to analyze and calculate these. However, calculating the impact of a single threat in isolation is not necessarily reasonable. For example, an earthquake may have secondary impacts such as power outages and fires. Common cause failure analysis is a technique to evaluate the “effect of inter-system and inter-component dependencies, which tend to cause simultaneous failures and thus significant increases in overall risk” (“Probabilistic risk assessment,” n.d.).
More concretely, consider a “system of systems” where individual components are highly interdependent. Assume that there are 4 key components, and each has only a 5% risk factor; that is, each is 95% risk-free. If you then compound the risk for the entire system, the safety factor drops precipitously to 81%:
95 x .95 x .95 x .95 = .8145
Another way of looking at this is that the probability of a complex event is nearly 20%.
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) recommends looking across multiple sectors when analyzing risks (DHS, 2009, pp. 27-28). The analysis should encompass “dependencies, interdependencies, and cascading effects; identification of common vulnerabilities; … common threat scenarios” (p. 27). Furthermore, across sectors, risks should be compared, prioritized, and controls should be shared (p. 27). DHS, however, recommends different approaches for different sectors:
For those sectors primarily dependent on fixed assets and physical facilities, a bottom-up, asset-by-asset approach may be most appropriate. For sectors such as Communications, Information Technology, and Agriculture and Food, with accessible and distributed systems, a top-down, business or mission continuity approach, or risk assessments that focus on network and system interdependencies may be more effective. (DHS, 2009, p. 28)

Summarize the events of a recent accounting scandal. Identify how the illegal/unethical act was detected and the punishments that resulted (fines, prison terms, etc.). Consider what could have been done to detect this act earlier and what could have been done to prevent this from happening in the first place. Select a different example than those listed on previous posts.

Just answer the bottom question or discussion (around 100 words):Do you believe we are currently living in a “period of great art”? Why or why not? Please share the names of the contemporary artists or art forms that inform your response. Are there periods of art throughout history that were better or worse than ours? What are some of them? In what ways were these periods better or worse? Please provide examples of the artists or art forms from those historic periods that inform your response. Please include at least one citation from our weekly reading in your post.

• Analyze the challenges managers face to determine (and discuss) which challenge is the most difficult to address. Recommend at least one approach to address that challenge.
• Predict the types of challenges facing managers 20 years from now and how those challenges could be addressed. Explain your rationale.

there red is no right or wrong answer

Trade-off and Pecking-order Theories
Several theories are proposed to explain how companies deal with
debt and financial distress. After reviewing the resources for this week:

• Compare and
  contrast trade-off theory and pecking-order theory.
• Describe a
  specific business that seems to follow trade-off theory and another that
  follows pecking-order theory.
• Why would
  these theories be more applicable in some industries than others?

International Finance
Critics
of the field of international finance charge that the field is simply
“corporate finance with an exchange rate.”

• Critique this statement.
• Do you agree or disagree
  with it? Why?
• Justify your answer with
  specific details.

Initial Public Offering

One method utilized by companies to
obtain the long-term capital necessary to run and grow their businesses is by
providing the general public with the option to purchase stocks. The company’s
first sale of stock is known as the initial public offering (IPO). When a
company first offers the IPO, stocks are, on average, underpriced.

• Discuss the
  implications of such underpricing to established theories of market
  efficiency.
• Explain the
  role market efficiency might play in the underpricing theories presented
  by Loughran and Ritter.

Which is easier to compute, the U in the LU decomposition or the R in the QR decomposition? Explain your reasoning?

Please read my instructor’s opinion and questions and write your opinion about it please.

These areTWO different short answer discussion quesitons please answer EACH question in the discussion and list references Many motivational theories focus on the
motivational quality of human needs. What do humans need? How do these needs motivate? How are these needs addressed in an organizational context? Provide an
example from your current organization. How well does it address the needs of its organizational members? What best practices can you suggest for organizations to
address human needs and motivate positive organizational behavior? An important element in high-performance organizations is the presence of clear and widely
embraced vision and values of an organization. Consider your own organization. Is the vision/mission/purpose for the organization clear? Are the values clear? Are
the vision and values widely embraced by organizational members? Are organizational members aligned with the vision? From your personal experiences and from
research, what are the consequences of having organizational members aligned to vision/values? What are the consequences of having organizational members who are
not aligned to vision/values? How do leaders align members to the organizational vision and inspire productive organizational behaviors?

Need those questions answered and also could be Google

just need short answers no apa needed.

Regarding the impressive evidence of modern psychology and contemporary biology, Rachels says the following: “As far as free will is concerned the overall trend is not encouraging. Each new discovery chips away a bit more of our confidence. The more we learn about the sources of human conduct the less room there seems to be for the idea of free choice.” So, how can you square this evidence with your feeling of freedom? In what sense to you think you are free?

I only need 100 words

Discuss how deficit spending relates to the economic collapse of the Greece and Spain economies. Relate their economic collapse to U.S. current economic problems. How does U.S. deficit spending affect our economy? Greece and Spain have introduced tax hikes, reduced paychecks of government workers, and made drastic spending cuts. These actions have caused violent protests. Should the U.S. follow their example? What would be the consequences of just printing more money to pay the debts of the government?

How do you rate online education? Please discuss both the pros and cons and how online education compares to face-to-face classes.

Please answer thoroughly.

An unanticipated change in the growth rate of aggregate demand affects production andemploymentbefore they affect prices. Speculate why this occurs.

Locate an example of effective argument and
bring to class for discussion today. This could
be a newspaper or magazine article, a blog post,
a cartoon, or something else. Be prepared to
talk about what the piece is saying overall, what
argument is being made, who is the intended
and actual audience, and how effective the
argument is. I will be collecting, so have this
printed out with your notes on it and your
name.